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Abstract 
During the last decades, the growth of trade between China and the Netherlands 
has been larger than the increase in bilateral trade flows between China and most 
other countries. Using a time series based gravity model, this paper investigates 
the main determinants of this increase. The empirical analysis indicates that, apart 
from GDP growth, Dutch in-house offshoring to China is a major determinant of 
Dutch import growth from China. Dutch firms tend to offshore production in-
house when the asset specificity of the traded inputs is high and offshore via the 
market when this asset specificity is low. Controlling for these product types also 
reveals that transport costs are more important for trade in homogeneous and 
reference priced goods than for trade in differentiated goods. 
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Trade between China and the Netherlands: a case study of 
globalization 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Trade between China and the Netherlands provides a topical example of the recent 
trend of globalization. China’s economy has been growing prodigiously with 
about 10% per year in the last decades. Its growth has benefited much from the 
world wide fragmentation of production where parts of the production chain have 
been moved to low cost countries. The Netherlands, as medium sized open 
economy, has a long tradition as trading nation and, in that respect, acts as a 
gateway to Europe. Dutch trade with China has been growing even faster than the 
Chinese economy for the past 10 years. Nowadays, China is the Netherlands’ fifth 
biggest trading partner, with 8% of total Dutch imports coming from China (CPB, 
2006). This fast growth, and the negative trade balance with China, has, like in 
most western economies, evoked a discussion about the effects of moving 
production abroad for the domestic economy, especially with respect to 
employment and economic growth. From that perspective, Suyker and De Groot 
(2006) and CPB (2006) conclude that Chinese export products are more 
complements than substitutes for Dutch export products and that China’s growth 
has had relatively little impact on Dutch employment. More in general, these 
studies indicate that China’s growth has mainly had a positive effect on the Dutch 
economy, for example through lower inflation. Similarly, Gorter, Tang and Toet 
(2005) state that massive reallocation of Dutch economic activities abroad is not 
likely and that it will not bring about a rise in Dutch unemployment. 
 
However, up to now no much empirical evidence is available on the specific 
determinants of this growth of trade between China and the Netherlands. The 
biggest controversy here regards the amount of offshoring in the Netherlands or 
its effects on the Dutch economy. On the one hand, evidence suggests that quite 
some activities are or soon will be outsourced to countries like China (e.g., 
Deloitte & Touche, 2002 and Ernst & Young, 2004), while the other view is that 
this type of outsourcing is present but marginal (e.g., Gorter et al., 2005; Suyker 
and De Groot, 2006) and has little effect on employment. This paper contributes 
to this core debate on the effects of globalization by analyzing the determinants of 
China-Dutch trade by means of a gravity model. The focus of the analysis is on 
whether offshoring from the Netherlands to China has had a significant effect on 
the trade growth between these two countries over the past ten years.  
 
More specifically the question is whether this offshoring has occurred through the 
market (outsourced offshoring) or through hierarchy (in-house offshoring) and 
whether this decision has been influenced by the asset specificity of the traded 
goods. This “make or buy” decision and its relation with asset specificity and 
transaction costs is a prominent subject in contemporary economic literature (e.g. 
Spencer, 2005 and Grossman and Helpman, 2003). Additionally the empirical 
analysis provides evidence on the usual determinants of bilateral trade flows, like 
GDP growth, tariff reduction and declining transport costs (e.g., Baier and 
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Bergstrand, 2001). A large part of Dutch imports are re-exports – imported goods 
which are legal property of the importer and which are exported with no, or only a 
very small modification. For that reason the importance of this function of the 
Netherlands as distributor- the gateway to Europe - in explaining the trade growth 
between the Netherlands and China is analyzed. This paper focuses on trade in 
goods as opposed to services. The latter have different dynamics and are only a 
small part of total Dutch trade. 
 
The contents of this paper are as follows. Section 2 explains the major aspects of 
trade between China and the Netherlands, and shows that trade growth between 
these countries has been relatively fast in this era of globalization. Section 3 
discusses the recent theory on trade flows, transaction costs and the make or buy 
and location decisions in offshoring. This section also provides a review of the 
relevant empirical literature. Section 4 discusses the data and modelling 
methodology. Section 5 presents and discusses the results of the empirical 
analysis. Finally section 6 concludes and discusses policy implications and 
suggestions for further research. 
 
2. Trade between China and the Netherlands 
 
Key statistics 
Table 1 illustrates the main differences between China and the Netherlands. The 
Netherlands is a medium sized highly developed open economy, whereas China 
has, in spite of its rapid growth of the last decades, a per capita income of about 
one third of that of the Netherlands. Whereas the Netherlands is mainly a service 
economy, in China agriculture and industry are still dominant. Although the 
Chinese regard themselves as excellent traders (and indeed all over the world they 
are), trade and foreign direct investments are relatively much more important in 
the Netherlands. The same applies for the use of internet. Mortality rates are 
substantially lower in the Netherlands than in China, which is another indication 
of the difference that still exists between the nations in their stages of 
development.  
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Size and composition of bilateral trade 
Notwithstanding the large differences and distance between China and the 
Netherlands, their bilateral trade has grown remarkably fast over the past 10 years. 
Table 2 reports t-ratio tests on the difference between China’s trade growth with 
its main partners and China’s trade growth with the Netherlands. It shows that 
trade growth between the Netherlands and China has been significantly (t ratio 
2.98, significant at 1%) greater than trade growth between China and the rest of 
the world for the past ten years. The second column of the table indicates that this 
growth was also important from an economic perspective, since on average trade 
between China and the Netherlands has grown 5.43 percentage points more than 
trade between China and the rest of the world. 
 
Table 2 also shows that trade between the Netherlands and China has grown 
significantly faster than China’s trade with seven out of eleven of its main 
partners. Only trade between China and India and between China and the 
Philippines has grown faster than Dutch China trade. A reason can be that India 
and the Philippines both have export baskets that are very compatible with 
China’s needs. India for example is naturally well endowed with iron ore, which 
China needs for its production sector (53% of Indian exports to China comprised 
iron ore in 2000). The Philippines on the other hand is skilled in the production of 
several high tech components, which China uses to assemble other high tech 
goods (Lall and Albaladejo, 2004). The relative fast growth of Dutch China trade 
makes it an interesting case study for the analysis of bilateral trade flows in the era 
of globalization. 
 
Table 1: Key statistics about China and the Netherlands (2005) 
 China  Netherlands 
    
Population (mln) 1300  16 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 72  79 
Mortality rate under-5 (per 1000) 27  5 
Internet users (per 1000 people) 85  739 
Improved sanitation facilities (% of urban population with 
access) 69 
 100 
    
GDP (current €, bln) 2125  493 
GDP per capita, (in $ at PPPs) 7204  30861 
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 13  2 
Industry, value added (% of GDP) 48  24 
Services, value added (% of GDP) 40  74 
Average Inflation (1990-2006, %) 5.08  2.43 
Average real GDP growth (1990-2006, %) 6.41  4.05 
Trade (€, bln) 1422  531 
Trade as % of GDP 67  122 
FDI stock (inward) 318  463 
FDI stock (inward) as % of GDP 14  94 
Sources: World Development Indicators Database 2007, Suyker and De Groot  (2006), IMF 
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Table 2: The relative fast growth of Dutch China trade 
Table 2 contains the output of 12 t-ratio tests on the difference between monthly trade growth 
between China and the Netherlands and China and its main partners. Trade growth between China 
and each of its main partners is calculated as TRGit= LN(TRit/TRit-12)*100. Here TRGit is the trade 
growth (continuously compounded) between China and its partner i at time t, LN represents the 
natural logarithm, TRit is the value of trade (import+export) between China and country i at time t, 
while TRit-12 is the same twelve months before. Growth rates thus compare the same month in two 
successive years. This mitigates any seasonal and monthly effects that might be present in the data. 
For each partner TRGit is subtracted from TRGnt, which is the trade growth between China and the 
Netherlands at time t, formally: ∆TRGit= TRGnt-TRGit. The T-ratio test (displayed in the second 
column) on ∆TRGit for each country is performed in the usual manner by dividing this variable’s 
average by its standard error (see Brooks, 2002 for a textbook explanation of the standard error 
and the use of t-ratio tests). Formally, for each country H0: ∆TRGit = 0 is tested against the 
alternative hypothesis H1: ∆TRGit ≠ 0. The third column represents the (arithmetic) average of 
∆TRGit for each country ( ∆TRG it ) in percentage points. The source of the data is CEIC, extracted 
through UBS Investment Bank, it is on a monthly base ranging from Jan 1996 – May 2006 (the 
choice of this period was based on availability) and thus has 113 data points for each country. Data 
for China’s trade with the Netherlands was taken from CBS Statline. *, ** and *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 China’s Trade Partners T-ratio Average of Difference 
( ∆TRG it ) 
Australia 2.25** 5.15 
India -2.26** -4.69 
Indonesia 3.14*** 7.50 
Japan 6.19*** 11.25 
Korea 2.30** 4.54 
Malaysia 0.06 0.13 
Philippines -1.80 -4.53 
Singapore 3.11*** 6.56 
Taiwan 3.03*** 6.02 
Thailand 1.28 2.31 
USA 3.08*** 5.66 
   
World (excl. 
Netherlands) 2.98*** 5.43 
 
 
A closer look at time series data of the bilateral trade flows reveals that most of 
the trade growth between the Netherlands and China has been through imports 
from China. This could partially be related to the function of distributor that the 
Netherlands plays between Asia and Europe. Evidence provided in personal 
communication by the Netherlands Bureau of Statistics (CBS) suggests that, apart 
from the afore mentioned re-exports  (Suyker and De Groot, 2006), a considerable 
amount of import from China is used as intermediate inputs for production in the 
Netherlands. It therefore represents offshoring of Dutch production to China. 
Trade growth between China and the Netherlands is furthermore likely to have 
been affected by China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. Next to a direct affect via 
tariff and quota reductions, there might be an indirect affect via institutional 
quality and trust. The latter two are however beyond the scope of this research and 
will not be further investigated. 
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According to data on SITC code level, the bulk (69%) of Dutch imports from 
China nowadays are goods classified as “Machinery and Transport Equipment” 
(MTE, SITC 7). A large part of these imported MTE goods are computers, 
telecommunication devices and components and parts of computers and office 
machinery. The composition of imports of the Netherlands from China has 
become more high-tech over the past ten years±, since MTE has become a larger 
part of goods import from China than in the mid 1990’s. Within the MTE 
category, computers and telecommunication devices have gained share at the cost 
of inter alia electrical machinery and apparatus. This is consistent with studies by 
e.g. Yue and Hua (2002), Rodrik (2006) and Schott (2006) who point out that 
China’s export basket is getting increasingly more high tech. At first sight it may 
be puzzling since China is (given its natural resources) expected to have a 
comparative advantage in low skilled labour intensive products. The reason can be 
the assembly in China of high-tech goods with the use of production from other 
Asian countries, which in this field dominates “home made” production (e.g., 
Gaulier et. al., 2006; Suyker and De Groot, 2006; Chen, 2005). Besides MTE, 
Miscellaneous Manufacture Articles (MMA, SITC 8) and Manufactured Goods 
Chiefly by Materials (MG, SITC 6) are important import categories of the 
Netherlands from China.. These two categories include footwear, clothes, 
handbags (MMA) and rubber tires, wood manufactures and household equipment 
of base metals (MG). 
 
Imports of China from the Netherlands are of a different kind. The type of traded 
products is also quite different. Data from 2006 reveal that the Dutch mainly 
exported MTE, non-food Crude Materials (CM, SITC 2) and Chemical and 
Related Products (CRP, SITC 5) to China. The MTE goods imported from the 
Netherlands are however not quite the same as the ones exported to the 
Netherlands. The former include (among others) machinery and equipment 
specialized for particular industries, valves and industrial cooling and heating 
equipment. CM exports to China currently include non-ferrous base metal waste, 
and crude vegetable materials, while CRP exports include for example 
hydrocarbons, alcohols and phenols. Apart from the difference in composition 
there is also a difference in size between exports and imports of China and the 
Netherlands: in 2006 Dutch exports to China were only around 12% of total 
Dutch China trade. 
 
All in all this overview of Dutch China trade suggests that differences in 
comparative advantages based on natural factor endowments are an unsatisfactory 
explanation for the Dutch China trade composition and evolution. China also 
seems to posses a comparative advantage in assembly, while the Netherlands 
exploits its traditional position as trading nation and distributor to Europe. That is 
why we, in section 4 include the Dutch distribution function, outsourced and in-
house offshoring and several trade barriers to explain the evolution of Dutch 
China trade. The next section provides a short introduction to the recent literature 
in this field. 
 
3. Trade, transaction costs and product types 
 
A major feature of modern trade theory is that it challenges the paradigm of 
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frictionless trade of classical trade theory. Instead of the notion that trade is for 
free, contemporary trade theory takes into account that trade involves considerable 
transaction costs (or trade costs) which set a limit to the amount of trade otherwise 
explained by comparative advantages (Trefler, 1995). Reduction of transaction 
costs evokes more trade and makes existing trade less expensive. The hypothesis 
is that a trading country like the Netherlands, with a major function of distributor 
and organizing production, will have a comparative advantage in keeping 
transaction costs low (see WRR, 2003).  In a similar way globalization and the 
increased fragmentation of production can be regarded as an effect of the 
reduction of transaction costs. This modern trade theory combines elements from 
the theory of the firm and (new) institutional economics. The latter theory 
proposes the view that production is also an organizational problem rather than 
just a technical one. It sees a firm as an organizational structure rather than just as 
a production function (Williamson, 1998). 
 
Theory of the Firm 
In his seminal contribution Coase (1937) pointed out that if the market mechanism 
freely coordinated the efficient allocation of production factors, firms would not 
exist. However, coordination costs, which Coase labelled “marketing costs”, do 
urge firms to make a decision whether to coordinate through their hierarchy or 
through the market. This decision determines optimal firm size where the 
marginal costs of allocation through the market are equal to the marginal costs of 
allocation within the hierarchy. In essence, Coase describes what is today known 
as the “make or buy” decision in the perspective of globalization. The term 
“transaction costs” was first used by Arrow (1969), who agreed with Coase by 
stating that the existence of vertical integration implies that there are costs 
involved in operating competitive markets. Therefore Arrow defined transaction 
costs as “costs of running the economic system” (Arrow, 1969). 
 
Types and Sources of Transaction Costs 
Here we specify transaction costs as all costs market participants make in 
exchanging goods, services and ideas. This definition encompasses direct costs 
like tariffs and transportation costs as well as indirect costs like search, 
contracting and monitoring costs. Transaction costs can be categorised in various 
ways. Williamson (1985) distinguishes between ex-post and ex-ante transaction 
costs, while Den Butter and Mosch (2003) elaborate this by distinguishing three 
stages in every transaction, namely the contact, contract and control stage. 
Linders (2006) categorizes transaction costs into costs arising from tangible and 
intangible barriers to trade. Tangible barriers to trade (e.g. transport and trade 
policy barriers) lead for example to transportation costs and tariffs. Intangible 
barriers (e.g. informational, cultural and institutional barriers) lead to more 
indirect costs, like the ones discussed by Williamson (1985, 1998). According to 
Linders, intangible barriers are more important for trade than tangible barriers. 
Therefore WRR (2003) poses that a trading country like the Netherlands should 
focus on reducing these intangible barriers, because they become relatively more 
important now that tangible barriers have continued to fall. 
 
Transaction costs are linked with incomplete information and relationship 
specificity, which can lead to uncertainty and opportunistic behaviour. In this 
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respect Nunn (2006) mentions the well-established insight from the theory of the 
firm that underinvestment will occur when investments are relationship specific 
and contracts cannot be enforced. Investments are considered to be relationship-
specific when their value outside of a buyer-seller relationship is significantly 
lower than within it. The underinvestment will occur because the trading partners 
want to prevent a “hold-up”. This underinvestment then leads to sub optimal level 
of trade. Consequently, firms invest time, effort and money in: finding a partner 
that is trustworthy (contact), establishing sound contracts (contract) and 
implement monitoring (control). All these investments are bound to reduce the 
probability and extent of opportunistic behaviour by a potential partner. Obviously 
the costs made to avoid such hold-ups are exacerbated in an international context. 
Seeking and gathering information about potential partners in another country is 
for example more difficult because of geographical distance, differences in 
(business) culture, language and the way information is distributed. These 
differences also make contracting, monitoring and enforcing more difficult. 
 
Transaction Costs and the Governance Structure of Firms 
Grossman and Helpman (2003) consider the afore mentioned “make or buy” 
decision in an international context. They argue that the classical dichotomy to 
make or buy is too simplistic to explain current patterns in international trade. 
Helpman (2006) shows that this decision has two dimensions. These two 
dimensions are geographical location and ownership structure. Firms must 
simultaneously choose whether to outsource (the ownership dimension) and 
whether to offshore (the geographical dimension). This leads to four possibilities; 
in-house production in the home country (insourcing), subcontracting input 
production to an external party in the home country (outsourcing), producing the 
inputs in-house through a subsidiary in a foreign country (in-house offshoring) or 
subcontracting input production to an external party in a foreign country 
(outsourced offshoring). Since the modelling of these simultaneous choices is 
quite complex and beyond the scope of this research, our analysis focuses on the 
latter two possibilities. 
 
Assume that a firm decides to move production (or parts thereof) to a foreign 
country. It then has to decide whether to keep this production in-house or to 
outsource to an external party. From a transaction costs perspective, this decision 
depends vitally on the asset specificity of the traded inputs. As assets become 
more relationship specific, the risk of opportunistic behaviour increases, which 
means that the costs of contracting increase more than the costs of vertical 
integration (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978). In such a situation one should, 
ceteris paribus, expect vertical integration to occur as opposed to outsourcing. 
 
In a network/search view of trade Rauch (1999) provides an operational way to 
distinguish between goods that require relatively large relationship specific 
investments and goods that do not. The argument is that an essential difference 
exists between homogeneous goods and differentiated goods. This leads to a 
practical distinction of three types of goods, namely goods that are sold on an 
organised exchange, goods that are reference priced (meaning that their prices are 
quoted regularly in trade publications) and goods that are neither of these. Rauch 
calls the latter type of goods differentiated goods. He states that these goods are 
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too heterogeneous to be compared on price alone since their price has to be 
adjusted to multidimensional differences in characteristics. Consequently, trade in 
these goods entails a lot more (relationship specific) search costs than goods sold 
on an organised exchange. Trade in differentiated goods is thus more prone to 
opportunistic behaviour. 
 
Similarly, Nunn (2006) argues that trade in differentiated products is more 
exposed to opportunistic behaviour than trade in homogeneous goods. That is 
because in the case of homogeneous goods less relationship specific search costs 
have to be made to match buyers and sellers. Homogeneous goods furthermore 
have values that do not differ much within or outside a trade relationship because 
their market is thick (i.e. has many buyers and sellers). In the case of 
differentiated goods exposure to opportunistic behaviour is also increased because 
they are more prone to the verifiability problem. Their quality cannot be perfectly 
assessed by third parties because of their heterogeneity. This has an impeding 
effect on monitoring and enforcement. In addition, contracts for differentiated 
goods are more incomplete since more factors than price alone have to be 
considered. All in all, differentiated goods are more prone to the hold up problem 
because of asset specificity and incomplete contracts and thus transaction costs are 
higher for this type of goods. 
 
Empirics 
Following the complaint of e.g. Trefler (1995) and Davis et.al. (1997) that 
traditional trade models are unable to explain today’s international trade, much 
research has emerged explaining trade patterns and volumes from a transaction 
cost perspective. Many of these studies find that distance negatively affects trade 
(e.g., Frankel and Rose, 2002 and Linders et.al., 2005). Here, distance is often 
viewed to be a proxy for intangible barriers to trade like for example cultural 
unfamiliarity and incomplete information, rather than just transport costs (Linders, 
2006). However, in a meta analysis Linders (2006) shows that the effect of 
distance on trade does vary quite a bit across the empirical literature. Indeed it is 
not clear what type of barriers distance is a proxy for. 
 
Baier and Bergstrand (2001) find that direct trade costs cost explain a significant 
part of trade growth. More specifically, they find that declining tariffs and 
transportation costs explain 25% and 8% respectively of trade growth in several 
OECD countries between 1950 and 1980. However, their model only explains 
40% of the variation in trade flow growth in their sample and their results cover a 
period in which tariffs and transportation costs are likely to have declined more 
than in recent years. From that perspective, Anderson (1999) states that current 
tariffs and transportation costs cannot sufficiently explain the resistance to trade. 
 
Trade has recently also been related to increased vertical specialization 
(outsourcing). Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) find that increased vertical 
specialization can account for a third of growth in trade between 1970 and 1990 of 
the countries in their analysis. A study by Yi (2003) shows that vertical 
specialization increases the sensitivity of trade to tariff reductions, since goods 
that are produced in several countries, pass multiple borders and are thus subject 
to multiple tariffs. This is in contrast to the view expressed by Anderson (1999) 
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since it implies that, although tariffs have not gone down as much in recent years 
as for example 20 years ago, the effect of tariff changes on trade would still be 
strong. 
 
A number of studies investigate the afore mentioned “make or buy” decision, i.e. 
the choice firms face to offshore via hierarchy or via the market. Grossman and 
Helpman (2003) show that this choice depends inter alia on the thickness of the 
market and on the verifiability of investment tasks. An increase of these variables 
reduce relationship specificity and thus are likely to induce outsourced offshoring 
as opposed to in-house offshoring. Lieberman (1991) uses a logit model to test 
whether asset specificity increases chances of US chemical producers to vertically 
integrate backwards. He finds that both his measures of asset specificity have a 
positively significant effect on firms’ decision to integrate backwards in his 
sample. Lieberman’s research, however, is only confined to the chemical industry. 
Maltz (1994) extends this analysis to other industries. His estimates of a logit 
model for the outsourcing of logistical activities confirm that asset specificity 
negatively affects the likelihood of outsourcing. On the other hand, Kvaloy (2003) 
poses a model in which the inefficiency resulting from a hierarchical structure 
(due to weaker incentives) is positively related to asset specificity. Hence, in 
Kvaloy’s model, firms would not have the incentive to internalize production even 
when the transaction is characterised by relationship specific investments. The 
reason is that the gain in transaction costs would be offset by the loss in efficiency 
of a hierarchical structure. However, this model has not been empirically tested.  
 
More recently, Nunn (2006) proposes that a country’s contracting environment 
might be an important determinant of its comparative advantage because of asset 
specificity. He finds that countries with good contracting environment specialize 
in industries that require large relationship specific investments. Moreover, 
empirical studies have found that institutional quality (Dixit, 2004; Linders, 
2006), trust (Den Butter and Mosch, 2003) and cultural differences (Guo, 2004) 
are important determinants of trade flows. Therefore, this survey of the literature 
shows that, although there is no consensus regarding which type of transaction 
costs is most prominent to affect trade, the notion that transaction costs matter is 
widely supported. Furthermore asset specificity can be regarded an important 
determinant of firms’ decision to make or buy. 
 
4. Data and methodology; the gravity model 
 
The Gravity Model 
The empirical analysis of this paper explains bilateral trade between China and the 
Netherlands form the perspective of transaction costs and globalization by means 
of the gravity model. This model, already mentioned by Tinbergen (1962), is 
commonly used for quantitative analysis of trade in contemporary economic 
research (Guo, 2004). The functional form of the gravity model is based on 
Newton’s gravity equation in physics. The economic gravity model expresses 
bilateral trade between countries as a function of their economic sizes and the 
physical distance between them. More specifically, it relates trade proportionally 
to economic size and inversely to distance in the absence of frictions. The 
frictions and facilitators of trade are then often added to this benchmark version of 
 11
the gravity model. This paper follows the same procedure, where we use time-
series data to estimate developments in Dutch China bilateral trade flows. 
 
The gravity model has often been criticized to lack a solid theoretical foundation, 
since its classic form is only based on an intuitive analogy between spatial 
interaction in physics and economics (Linders, 2006). However, literature has 
found the model to work well empirically, producing sensible parameter estimates 
(Rose, 2005). In addition, nowadays the gravity model has obtained a rigorous 
theoretical underpinning by deriving it from models of imperfect competition and 
product differentiation (e.g., Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Anderson and Van 
Wincoop, 2004). Deardorff (1998) shows that the gravity equation is also 
consistent with Heckscher Ohlin theory under perfect competition. Consequently, 
the gravity equation can be derived from both neo-classical and new trade models 
as a reduced form equation that explains bilateral trade patterns  (Linders, 2006) 
The simple version of the model, assuming frictionless trade, and identical and 
homothetic preferences across countries, can be written as: 
 
Tij = Yi
Y j
Yw
       (1), 
 
where Tij is export from country i to j, Yi, Yj and Yw are the economic size of 
country i, j and the world respectively. 
 
Following the gravity model’s assumption that trade between two countries is 
proportional to their economic size, this paper uses the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) of China and the Netherlands as an explanatory variable for Dutch China 
trade growth. The variables for economic size are denoted as GDPct and GDPnt, 
where the subscript t stands for time and c and n stand for China and the 
Netherlands respectively. The variable of world economic size is not explicitly 
included in the regression model, but is assumed to be captured by the constant 
term of the regression. Note that since world GDP appears in equation (1) as a 
denominator, after logarithmic transformation it becomes negative (thus the 
constant of the regression model is assumed to be negative). Furthermore, since 
causality runs both ways between trade and GDP, these variables are lagged one 
period to mitigate simultaneous equation bias.  
 
Other explanatory variables: FDI, Outsourced Offshoring and Dutch Re-Exports 
In order to investigate the effects of globalization on Dutch China trade, additional 
explanatory variables, which represent the effects described in the previous 
section, are added to the basic specification (1). In-house offshoring to China is 
measured by the stock of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) done by the 
Netherlands in China. This variable is denoted by FDIt, where the subscript t 
stands for time. The FDI variable comprises “capital provided by a foreign direct 
investor (the parent company) to an affiliate enterprise, to obtain a lasting interest 
and influence in that enterprise” (Suyker and de Groot, 2006: 41). Actually, FDI 
flows are more commonly used than stocks in economic research. Most of these 
papers however use cross sectional data. In the time series data of this paper the 
growth in FDI stocks is equal to FDI flows. 
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FDI can have either a vertical or horizontal nature. This dichotomy is based on 
two different views on the multinational activities of firms. The proximity 
concentration hypothesis states that multinational activity of firms is led by the 
trade off between being close to customers and suppliers and the loss of scale 
economies at the plant level. The factor proportion hypothesis on the other hand 
states that multinational activity is mainly motivated by production efficiency 
reasons (Markusen and Maskus, 2001). This implies that vertical FDI takes place 
when firms internationally fragmentise production via subsidiaries (i.e. in-house), 
while horizontal FDI occurs when firms undertake the same activities in multiple 
countries. Consequently, when FDI is found to have a positive affect on trade it 
can be assumed to have a vertical nature (since the FDI leads to import of 
intermediate goods), while a negative relationship implies a horizontal nature 
(since exports are substituted by sales through foreign branches). The question 
whether FDI is horizontal or vertical has been heavily debated in economic 
literature (e.g, Markusen and Maskus, 2001). Although consensus has not been 
reached yet, evidence seems to suggest that FDI between economically similar 
countries is horizontal while FDI between very dissimilar countries is vertical 
(e.g., Gorter, Tang and Toet, 2005).  
 
Several studies have rejected the vertical model in favour of the horizontal model 
(e.g, Blonigen et.al., 2003). However, these studies may be biased because they 
all use data on FDI originating in and going to developed countries. This makes it 
more likely to find results conforming that most FDI is horizontal. When data on 
substantially dissimilar economies are used in the analyses, the results indicate 
that vertical FDI dominates horizontal FDI (Waldkirch, 2003). Suyker and De 
Groot (2006) on the other hand suggest that FDI flows from the Netherlands to 
China have a horizontal rather than a vertical character, but their analysis is based 
on reviewing a few Dutch company annual reports and interpreting FDI data 
without statistical analysis. 
 
Reverse causality might also exist between trade and FDI. Vernon’s (1966) 
product cycle hypothesis suggests that trade can cause FDI because multinational 
firms trading with foreign markets get to know the foreign country’s economic, 
political and social situation better and become less uncertain to invest in it. For 
that reason we included the FDI variable with a one period lag in our regressions. 
 
In order to estimate the effects of outsourced offshoring, we constructed a 
measure based on the imports of intermediate goods. Here we follow Hummels 
et.al. (2001) and Yi (2003). According to Hummels et.al., vertical specialization 
requires the export of the goods that are partly produced in foreign countries. 
Therefore their measure of vertical specialisation is based on the proportion of  
goods that require foreign inputs and after finishing are exported. So this measure 
of vertical specialization (VS) in a certain country is defined as the ratio of 
imported intermediates to output multiplied by exports: 
 
VSt =
IIGt
OPt
 
 
 
 
 
 ∗TEX t       (2), 
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where OPkt is defined as: 
 
OPt = VAt + It       (3) 
 
Here, VSt stands for Dutch vertical specialization, IIGt is the total Dutch import of 
intermediate goods, OPt represents Dutch output (which is defined as the sum of 
intermediate input (It) and valued added (VAt)) and TEXt represents total Dutch 
exports, excluding re-exports. This measure is an indicator for the value of 
imported input content in the exports of the Netherlands at time t. We 
acknowledge that this proxy represents overall vertical specialization in the 
Netherlands and not specifically relates to vertical specialisation to China. 
However, information from the CBS suggests that a substantial part of Dutch 
imports of intermediate goods are from China. 
 
The use of intermediate goods to measure international outsourcing is common in 
economic literature (e.g., Feenstra and Hanson, 1996 and Hummels et. al., 2001). 
There are several caveats of using this measure. A first caveat is that the 
classification of goods as “intermediate” is rather arbitrary (Hummels et.al. 2001). 
Tyres for example could be classified as intermediate goods (since they are used 
as inputs in the production of a final good, namely automobiles) as well as final 
goods (since they are also bought by households). Another vexation is that import 
of intermediate goods represents in-house offshoring as well as outsourced 
offshoring. The assumption of the indicator VS made here is that the effect of 
outsourced offshoring is big enough to give different results than the effect of 
FDI, which solely measures in-house offshoring. In addition, imported 
intermediates that are used as inputs for final goods that are not exported are not 
counted by this proxy as part of vertical specialization. 
 
As mentioned before, the Netherlands traditionally has been an important 
distribution hub for Europe. Therefore, the importance of the Dutch function of 
distributor is also likely to have an effect on Dutch China trade. Dutch re-exports 
are a good measure for this function. It must be noted, however, that re-export is 
not only a distributive process – transit trade is. In re-exports value is also added 
to products in various ways, ranging from, storage and bulk breaking to slight 
modification (for example the mixing/thinning of certain chemicals). In our 
regression we represent the Dutch function as distributor, Dt  by the ratio of Dutch 
re-exports to total Dutch trade: 
 
Dt =
RE t
TRt
      (4), 
where TRt is defined as:  
TRt = TIM t + TEX t      (5) 
 
REt represents total Dutch re-exports and TRt is total Dutch trade (which is 
defined as the sum of total Dutch import and export, represented by TIMt and 
TEXt respectively). Hence, this variable is a measure of the importance of the 
Dutch distribution function to its trade. Dividing re-exports by total trade 
furthermore mitigates the effect of inflation and relieves the endogeneity problem 
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that would occur if just re-exports were used as an explanatory variable 
 
Transport Costs and Tariffs 
As proxy for transport costs as determinant we use the Cost Insurance and Freight 
to Free On Board ratio (CIF/FOB) of the trade between the Netherlands and 
China. This ratio is the usual indicator of transport costs (TC) in empirical studies 
(e.g., Hummels, 1999 and Baier and Bergstrand, 2001). It is defined as: 
 
TCt =
IM t
EXct
 
 
 
 
 
 −1
 
 
 
 
 
      (6) 
 
Here IMt represents the value of Dutch imports from China (which are registered 
including insurance and freight costs, i.e. CIF), EXct represents Chinese exports to 
the Netherlands (which are registered excluding cost, insurance and freight, i.e. 
FOB) and the subscript c indicates that the exports are from China. The basic idea 
behind the proxy is that without transport costs, the value of exports from China 
to the Netherlands should be the same as the value of Dutch imports from China. 
Since customs register exports on an FOB base (i.e. excluding insurance and 
freight costs) while imports are registered CIF (i.e. including insurance and freight 
costs), there is a difference, which is a measure of transport costs. TCt thus 
expresses these transport costs in ad-valorem equivalent terms. 
 
We acknowledge that also this measure has several shortcomings. First, it is a 
relatively aggregated measure: it is not informative about which transport costs 
matter most, nor does it reveal which goods are most sensitive to transport costs. 
Second, when using CIF/FOB ratios, the effect of transport costs is contaminated 
with the effect of insurance costs. Third and more importantly, the use of 
CIF/FOB ratios in this case is troubled by the fact that the registration of transit 
trade from China to other countries can be flawed. That is because transit trade is 
reported as going to the Netherlands, while it only passes through Netherlands on 
its way to another country. Since these goods never become legal property of a 
Dutch citizen, Dutch customs do not register these goods in transit. It implies that 
more goods are registered to have left China to go the Netherlands than the goods 
which are registered to have arrived in the Netherlands. This brings about the 
inconsistency that the value of goods exported to the Netherlands from China is 
consistently higher than the Dutch import value of Chinese goods.  
 
Fortunately, Eurostat and the China Statistical Yearbook report data on the 
quantities (in 100 kg) of goods traded between the Netherlands and China. The 
data reveals that not only the value but also the quantity of goods exported from 
China to the Netherlands is higher than the quantity of goods arriving in the 
Netherlands from China. It seems to confirm that goods that are shipped from 
China through the Netherlands are registered in China as going to the 
Netherlands. In case this notion is true, the difference can be used to extract the 
flow of goods between the Netherlands and China that are merely in transit from 
goods that are actually traded and become property of Dutch citizens In order to 
separate transit trade from “real” trade, the following procedure is used. The euro 
value of exports from China to the Netherlands is divided by their quantity in kg. 
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This gives a Euro value per 100 kg of Chinese goods exported to the Netherlands. 
The ratio is then multiplied by the difference between the quantities of Chinese 
exports to the Netherlands and the quantities of Dutch imports from China. This 
gives the value of the goods that are shipped through but not to the Netherlands 
but are registered as such. Subtracting this value from the total value of Chinese 
goods exported to the Netherlands according to the registration in China, (EXct), 
gives the transit corrected value of Chinese goods exported to the Netherlands 
(CEXct). 
 
Consequently, the corrected measure for transport costs, CTCt, becomes: 
 
CTCt =
IM t
CEXct
 
 
 
 
 
 −1
 
 
 
 
 
       (7) 
 
where CEXct is defined as: 
 
CEXct = EXct −
EX ct
Qct
 
 
 
 
 
 ∗ Qct − Qnt( )
 
 
 
 
 
     (8)
 
 
Here, Qct is the quantity (in 100 kg) of Chinese goods exported the Netherlands, 
Qnt is the quantity (in 100 kg) of Dutch goods imported from China and IMt and 
EXct are as defined in (6). This transit trade corrected measure for transport costs 
is an improvement of the standard CIF/FOB ratio and has, to our knowledge, not 
been used before in empirical studies of the gravity model. 
 
The effect of tariffs on trade is quite difficult to measure since there is a large 
variation in tariffs imposed between different goods. Countries also discriminate 
between trading partners by applying different tariffs on the same type of good. 
Nevertheless, we tried to measure the effect of tariffs on Dutch China trade with 
the use of “average applied import tariff rates on non- agricultural and non-fuel 
products” in China and the European Union (Data are taken from UNCTAD) This 
variable is denoted by TAeut and TAct, where n and c denote the Netherlands and 
China respectively. Of course agricultural and fuel products are excluded from 
this measure but this problem is not likely to be very large as agricultural and food 
products are not a large part of Dutch China trade. 
 
In the empirical analysis of the next section all data has been converted to a 
common currency, corrected for inflation and for seasonal effects, and converted 
into growth rates. The analysis uses quarterly time series data with observation 
period 1996:I-2006:IV. In order to exclude seasonal variation from the data, 
growth rates are yearly averages.  
 
5. Empirical analysis for various product types 
 
As benchmark regression we first estimated the frictionless specification of the 
gravity model for Dutch imports from and exports to China. These equations read 
as:  
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tntctt PDGPDGMI εβββ +++= −− 12110 &&&      (9) 
 
tntctt PDGPDGXE εβββ +++= −− 12110 &&&                (10) 
 
Here, the dot above the variables indicates growth rates, IMt and EXt are the Dutch 
imports from and exports to China respectively, β0 represents the intercept of the 
model, εt is the error term and GDPct-1 and GDPnt-1 are the lagged GDPs of China 
and the Netherlands respectively. Since logs appear on both sides of the equation 
the coefficients of these models can be interpreted as elasticities.  
 
The arguments and data construction of the previous section give rise to the full 
model specifications where the explanatory variables representing various aspects 
of globalization are added to the benchmark gravity equations (9) and (10): 
 
teutttttntctt ATCTCDSVIDFPDGPDGMI εββββββββ ++++++++= −−− &&&&&&&& 76541312110
 (11)  
 
tcttttntctt ATCTCDIDFPDGPDGXE εβββββββ +++++++= −−− &&&&&&& 6541312110                 
(12) 
 
Again the dot indicates growth rates, β0 represents the intercept of the model, εt is 
the error term and IMt, EXt, GDPct-1 and GDPnt-1 are as in (9) and (10). FDIt-1 is 
the lagged value of Dutch FDI stocks in China, VSt is a measure of Dutch 
outsourced offshoring, Dt is the importance of the Dutch function as distributor, 
CTCt is a measure for transportation costs and TAeut and TAct are the average tariff 
rates in the European Union and China respectively. We note that the variable VS 
is not included in (12). The reason is that there is no a priori justification for 
Dutch offshore outsourcing to affect exports to China. The coefficients of the 
equations can again be interpreted as elasticities. 
 
The next step in our empirical analysis is to see whether the effects of the 
(additional) determinants differ along with the type of product that are traded. For 
that reason detailed trade data (3 digit SITC) between the Netherlands and China 
is extracted from CBS Statline and sorted in three groups, namely differentiated 
goods, reference priced goods and homogeneous goods. The sorting procedure is 
based on the classification of Rauch (1999). In fact, Rauch specifies two versions 
of his classification, namely a “liberal” one and a “conservative” one. The 
conservative classification is stricter than the liberal classification in defining 
goods as homogeneous or reference priced. This paper makes use of the 
conservative classification. The 3 digit SITC codes belonging to the three types of 
goods are downloaded from John Haveman’s website.1 Using these data, the 
models (9)-(12) are estimated with trades of each of the three types of goods as 
                                                 
1
 
www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/TradeData.html
#classification  
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dependent variable: i.e. for dtMI & , dtXE & , rtMI & , rtXE & , htMI &  and htXE & . Here the 
subscripts d, r, and h indicate differentiated, reference priced and homogeneous 
goods respectively. These models are numbered (9a)-(12a), (9b-12b) and (9c-12c), 
with a, b and c representing that the dependent variable consists of differentiated, 
reference priced and homogeneous goods respectively.  
 
All regressions are checked on robustness: the residuals are tested for serial 
correlation and heteroscadasticity and the models are tested for parameter stability 
using Chow tests. 
 
Results for the models for total imports and exports 
Table 3 gives the estimation results for the gravity models for total product trade 
between China and the Netherlands. The results for specification (1) relate to the 
benchmark gravity models (9) and (10) discussed in the previous section. The 
results in the columns under specification (2) are the estimates for the full models 
(11) and (12) where all explanatory variables with respect to the effects of 
globalization are added. The adjusted R2 for the benchmark models is 0.67 and 
0.66 for imports and exports respectively. This indicates that more than half of the 
growth in trade between the Netherlands and China can be explained by the 
growth of their economies. This explanatory power of the benchmark models is in 
line with most estimations of the standard frictionless gravity model equation. In 
the full model the explanatory power as compared to the benchmark model rises 
substantially after the trade barriers and trade facilitators are added as explanatory 
variables. The models now explain 77% of Dutch import growth from China and 
71% of Dutch export growth to China. Similar values and differences between 
benchmark and full models are also found for the explanatory power of the model 
for various types of goods in the following tables 5-7.   
 
The results of table 3 indicate that imports from China are a little more sensitive to 
(Dutch) demand growth while the exports growth to China are more sensitive to 
(Dutch) supply growth. The difference between these demand and supply 
elasticities is small though, for imports as well as exports. The intercept, of 
models model (9) and (10) are positive, while the intercept is found to be negative 
in most gravity models. Still, this result is intuitive since the significantly positive 
intercept implies that even if the growth of Dutch and Chinese GDP is zero, there 
is still trade growth between these two countries. It seems that there is some decay 
in friction (i.e. reduction in transaction costs) over time causing trade between 
China and the Netherlands to grow above their GDP growth. The intercepts of the 
full models are negative and significant, congruent with the theoretical 
expectations of the gravity model. The intercepts of the models can be interpreted 
as the average quarterly growth rates of world GDP over the sample period. These 
intercepts are indeed quite close to the real quarterly growth of world output, 
which was a little below 1% during the sample period. 
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Table 3: Trade between the Netherlands and China: growth of total imports 
and exports, 1996:I – 2006: IV 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variable: tMI &  
Dependent 
Variable: tXE &  
Dependent 
Variable: tMI &  
Dependent 
Variable: tXE &  
Constant  
 
1.58*** 
(3.39) 
0.26*** 
(3.72) 
-0.77** 
(-2.15) 
-0.92** 
(-2.27) 
1−ctPDG &  
 
0.91*** 
(4.99) 
0.91*** 
(5.03) 
0.71*** 
(4.11) 
0.88*** 
(3.96) 
1−ntPDG &  
 
0.98*** 
(6.94) 
0.99*** 
(6.25) 
0.81*** 
(2.99) 
0.91*** 
(4.08) 
1−tIDF &  
 
  
0.60*** 
(3.77) 
0.23 
(0.77) 
tSV &  
 
  
0.33 
(1.44)  
tD&  
 
  
1.78*** 
(6.12) 
0.28 
(1.05) 
tCTC &  
 
  
-0.14 
(-1.05) 
-0.24** 
(-2.09) 
eutAT &  
 
  
-0.33* 
(-1.76)  
ctAT &  
 
   
-0.29*** 
(-3.31) 
     
Observations 38 38 38 38 
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.66 0.77 0.71 
F-statistic 40.55 39.16 29.02 31.27 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
An interesting result is that growth of Dutch FDI stocks in China has a positive 
influence on Dutch imports from China. This effect is significant at the 1% level, 
while the influence of FDI on Dutch exports to China is insignificant (although 
positive). According to the model, a 1% increase in Dutch FDI stocks in China, 
leads to an increase in Dutch imports from China of 0.60%. This seems to 
corroborate the idea that FDI flows are complements instead of substitutes for 
trade, which is in accordance with the factor proportion hypothesis. Thus FDIs 
from the Netherlands to China seem to be of a vertical character, rather than a 
horizontal character as suggested by Suyker and De Groot (2006). If the latter was 
true, the model should have indicated a significantly negative relationship 
between the FDI variable and Dutch exports to China. 
 
The fact that the FDI variable is significantly positive implies, that Dutch China 
trade growth has indeed been affected by Dutch offshoring to China. This 
offshoring is likely to be in-house since the FDI variable is significant, while the 
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outsourced offshoring variable (VS) remains insignificant. These results are 
somewhat congruent with Liu et.al.(2001) who also find a positive relationship 
between lagged growth of FDI and import growth. Liu et.al.(2001) however find 
larger coefficients for FDI and also find that the relationship between FDI and 
import grows stronger when FDI is lagged more periods. A reason for such longer 
delay can be that it takes some time to set up a plant in a foreign country or to 
integrate two firms after an acquisition. It might thus take some time before the 
foreign subsidiary is ready to supply intermediate goods to the “home” country. 
This notion seems to be supported by an estimation result not reported here, 
namely when model (11) is estimated without lagging FDI. In that case the 
coefficient on FDI is lower, although still significant and positive. Alternatively, 
the stronger effect of lagged FDI growth on import growth could also be the cause 
of increased trust between the trading parties. 
 
The increasing importance of the Dutch function as distributor has had an 
important positive effect on Dutch imports from China over the past ten years. In 
fact, the coefficient on this variable ( tD& ,1.78) is the highest among all coefficients 
of model (12). This suggests that Dutch imports from China are most sensitive to 
the growth in the function as distributor of the Netherlands compared to the other 
variables. The effect of the Netherlands as distributor on export to China is, 
however, insignificant. Dutch export growth to China seems to be mainly 
sensitive to the GDP growth of China and the Netherlands. This accords with the 
notion that Dutch re-exports mainly are distributed to the rest of Europe instead of 
Asia. 
 
The interpretation of the estimated effects of the transportation cost variable 
tCTC &  is somewhat less straightforward. Although the signs of the coefficients on 
this variable are both as expected (i.e. negative), the coefficient, with a t-value of 
just over 1.0, is not significant for import, while it is significant for export. A 
reason for this low effect of transportation costs for import can be that the 
composition of imports between the Netherlands and China has become more 
high-tech. As Baier and Bergstrand (2001) note, one of the assumptions when 
using CIF/FOB ratios to proxy transportation costs is that the composition of trade 
doesn’t change much. Since CIF/FOB ratios also include insurance costs, the 
changing composition of Dutch trade with China could have offset the effect of 
declining transportation costs. The reason behind this is that, as trade becomes 
more high tech, the insurance costs of these goods go up, which tempers the effect 
of decline in actual transportation costs. Another reason that transportation costs 
seem to have significantly affected Dutch exports to China but not imports from 
China can be related to differences in volume between import and export goods. 
Exports to China might have a lower value to weight ratio (i.e. they are bigger in 
size) than imports from China, which means that they are more sensitive to 
transportation cost changes. A large part of exports to China comprise reference 
priced and homogeneous goods, while the bulk of imports from China consists of 
differentiated goods. The latter are more likely to have a high value to weight ratio 
and are thus likely to be less sensitive to transportation cost changes. 
 
The change in average tariff rates has (as expected) a significantly negative 
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impact on imports as well as exports between the Netherlands and China. 
Furthermore, imports from China seem to be more sensitive of tariff declines than 
exports to China. The difference between the two sensitivities is rather small 
though. The sensitivities of trade to tariff rates are much smaller than found by Yi 
(2003). But the variation in Yi’s findings is quite large. Yi’s estimates of the effect 
of tariff reductions of 1% lead to an increase in export growth from 1.7% to 42%, 
depending on the specification of the model. 
 
Table 4 gives the total growth of the variables of models (11) and ( 12) over the 
observation period 1996-2006. Using the methodology of Baier and Bergstrand, 
2001) and given these growth rates, the contribution of each of the explanatory 
variables to the growth of imports and exports can be calculated. 
  
Table 4: Growth of selected variables between 1996-2006 
Variable MI &  XE &  cPDG &  nPDG &  IDF &  
Growth 249.95 150.74 116.45 23.83 158.19 
      
Variable SV &  D&  CTC &  euAT &  cAT &  
Growth 72.10 35.46 -7.00 -25.08 -109.46 
Note: Growth rates are corrected for inflation, on a logarithmic base and are calculated as 
LN(X2006/X1996)*100. 
 
 
Model (11) can account for 237 percentage points of the 250% growth of Dutch 
imports, which is approximately 95% of that growth. This is built up as follows: 
the growth of Dutch and China GDP led to 102 percentage points of Dutch import 
growth from China, FDI accounts for 95 points, the Dutch function as distributor 
accounts for 63 points, European tariff declines account for 8 points and the 
coefficient on world GDP implies a negative effect of 31 points. This result is 
interesting since it implies that only a third (28%) of the growth in Dutch imports 
from China over the past ten years can be attributed to overall GDP growth 
(including the negative affect of world GDP growth), the other half is mainly 
explained by in-house offshoring to China (38%), the increased distribution 
activities of the Netherlands (25%) and only 3% by declining EU tariff rates. 
Thus, in-house offshoring of Dutch production activities to China is calculated to 
have contributed more to Dutch China import growth than overall GDP growth or 
increased Dutch distribution activities, even though imports are more sensitive to 
changes in the latter two variables. Furthermore the contribution of tariff declines 
is statistically significant, but the calculated effect is small. 
 
For Dutch exports to China, the result is somewhat different. Again, the model can 
explain a large part of the 151% growth of Dutch exports to China, namely 122 
points (approximately 81%). But the main part of this increase stems from GDP 
growth, namely 88 points (approximately 58%). The remainder is mainly 
explained by declines in Chinese tariff rates (32 points, 21%). Reduced transport 
costs only explain only 1.7 points (approximately 1%). It implies that the 
contribution of declining tariff rates is larger for exports to China than for imports 
from China, even though the sensitivity of the latter is higher. The reason is of 
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course that China has declined its tariff rates more rigorously than Europe, which 
already had quite low average tariff rates. The finding that tariff rates have a larger 
effect on trade than transport costs is in line with previous findings in economic 
literature (e.g., Baier and Bergstrand, 2001). 
 
All in all, the estimation results suggest that, apart from GDP growth, Dutch 
offshoring to China has positively and significantly affected the trade growth 
between the Netherlands and China.  
 
Estimation results for three different types of products 
This section investigates whether the governance structure of offshoring to China 
by Dutch firms depends on the asset specificity of the traded inputs. In order to 
answer this question, goods are sorted into three levels of asset specificity, namely 
(i) differentiated products (high level of asset specificity), (ii) reference priced 
goods (medium/low level of asset specificity) and (iii) homogeneous goods (low 
level of asset specificity). Table 5 gives the estimation results of the full models 
(11) and (12) (specification 2) for each of these three types of goods separately. As 
the estimates of the benchmark models, with GDP growth elasticities just below 
1.0, do not differ much from each other, we omit these results and focus the 
discussion on the effects of the additional variables in the full models.  
 
Ad (i) Differentiated Goods 
The estimation results in the first two columns of table 5 show that the effect of 
Dutch FDI in China is stronger for differentiated goods than for total imports from 
China. Here, an increase in Dutch FDI stocks in China of 1% is estimated to 
increase Dutch imports from China by 0.65%. The coefficient of the outsourced 
offshoring proxy though is still insignificant. Also, Dutch FDI stock in China does 
not affect Dutch exports to China significantly. As yet, the coefficient of this 
variable is positive, suggesting that Dutch FDIs to China mainly have a vertical 
character.  
 
The already sizeable effect of the Dutch function of distributor on imports from 
China also becomes somewhat stronger in case of differentiated goods as 
compared to total goods. An increase in the Dutch re-export to total trade ratio of 
1% leads to an estimated growth of imports from China of 1.81%. This is in 
accordance with the findings of Mellens et. al. (2007) that a large part of Dutch 
re-exports are computers and other electronic devices (which are classified by 
Rauch (1999) as differentiated goods). 
 
The coefficient on the proxy for transportation costs has the expected sign, but is 
not significant at the conventional levels. Thus transportation costs do not seem to 
have significantly affected Dutch China trade of differentiated goods. The effect 
of tariff changes is similar to the results found in table 3. Declines in the tariff 
rates of China and the EU have a significantly negative effect on trade between 
the Netherlands and China. The effect of tariff rate declines is again greater for 
imports from China, than for exports to China. 
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Table 5: Trade between the Netherlands and China sorted by product type 
Specification 2 
                     Differentiated goods                    Reference priced goods                   Homogeneous goods 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variable: 
dtMI &  
Dependent 
Variable: 
dtXE &  
Dependent 
Variable: 
rtMI &  
Dependent 
Variable: 
rtXE &  
Dependent 
Variable: 
htMI &  
Dependent 
Variable: 
htXE &  
Constant  
 
-0.76** 
(-2.21) 
-0.88** 
(-2.44) 
-0.88* 
(-1.91) 
-0.79** 
(-2.33) 
-0.95* 
(-1.83) 
-0.91** 
(-2.21) 
1−ctPDG &  
 
0.74*** 
(3.07) 
0.84*** 
(3.46) 
0.80*** 
(3.54) 
0.92*** 
(4.22) 
0.71*** 
(3.60) 
0.80*** 
(4.92) 
1−ntPDG &  
 
0.83*** 
(4.51) 
0.90*** 
(3.71) 
0.87*** 
(3.97) 
0.97*** 
(5.19) 
0.76*** 
(4.64) 
0.88*** 
(6.01) 
1−tIDF &  
 
0.65*** 
(6.67) 
0.37 
(0.49) 
0.42 
(1.07) 
0.53 
(1.17) 
0.22 
(0.76) 
0.31 
(0.86) 
tSV &  
 
0.25 
(0.98)  
0.43** 
(2.09)  
0.51*** 
(3.04)  
tD&  
 
1.81*** 
(7.58) 
0.32 
(1.05) 
1.03*** 
(4.08) 
0.48 
(0.52) 
0.38** 
(2.17) 
0.42 
(0.62) 
tCTC &  
 
-0.13 
(-1.35) 
-0.14 
(-1.05) 
-0.61** 
(2.24) 
-0.63* 
(-1.80) 
-0.70*** 
(3.24) 
-0.72*** 
(-2.97) 
eutAT &  
 
-0.35* 
(-1.84)  
-0.38* 
(-1.92)  
-0.29* 
(-1.97)  
ctAT &  
 
 
-0.32*** 
(-3.72)  
-0.35*** 
(-4.72)  
-0.23*** 
(-3.88) 
       
Observations 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Adjusted R2 0.78 0.73 0.71 0.68 0.73 0.68 
F-statistic 33.15 34.16 30.24 28.95 37.25 35.56 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
The fact that the results of columns 1 and 2 of table 5 are much similar to the 
results in table 3 implies that the trade between China and the Netherlands is 
dominated by trade in differentiated products. In fact the trade between the 
Netherlands and China has mainly comprised differentiated products and the 
importance of differentiated goods in this trade relation has increased over the 
past ten years. Namely, the share of differentiated goods in Dutch China trade has 
increased from 77% in 1996 to 89% in 2006. This is congruent with Nunn’s 
(2006) proposition that countries with good contract environment specialize in 
industries that rely heavily on relationship specific investments. Nunn shows that 
the Netherlands has a top 10 position in the world based on the quality of 
contractual environment. Given this rating it can be expected that the Dutch 
specialize in goods characterized with high asset specificity. 
 
Ad (ii) Reference Priced Goods 
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Columns 3 and 4 of  table 5 give the estimation results for reference priced goods. 
The positive effect of the Dutch function of distributor on imports is still positive 
and significant, although the effect is smaller than displayed in table 3 and 
columns 1 and 2 of table 5. This indicates that Dutch import of differentiated 
goods is more sensitive to Dutch distribution activities than import of reference 
priced goods. 
 
The most interesting changes as compared to the types of goods analysed 
previously relate to the effects of FDI and VS. FDI is no longer found to 
significantly affect Dutch imports from China. Instead it appears that outsourced 
offshoring has a significant positive effect on these imports. It corroborates the 
view that the decision of firms to internationally fragmentise production via the 
hierarchy of via the market depends on the transaction costs resulting from the 
asset specificity of the traded inputs. The estimation results suggest that Dutch 
firms tended to offshore production to China via subsidiaries when the traded 
inputs had a high level of asset specificity, while this offshoring has been via the 
market in case the products had a medium/low level of asset specificity. 
 
The estimated coefficients for transport costs are substantially higher than those 
found in table 3 and columns 1 and 2 of table 5. It is consistent with Rauch’s 
(1999) findings that transportation costs matter most for reference priced and 
homogeneous goods as opposed to differentiated goods. 
 
Ad (iii) Homogeneous Goods 
The most salient result of the last two columns of table 5 with estimation results 
for homogeneous goods is that the coefficient on VS is significant and positive for 
imports while the coefficient on FDI is not significant. The effect of outsourced 
offshoring even becomes larger (from 0.43 to 0.51) than in case of reference 
priced goods. In fact, this variable accounts for 28% of the growth in Dutch 
imports from China of homogeneous goods during the past ten years, which is 
similar to Yi’s (2003) findings that vertical specialization has accounted for 
around a third of world trade growth. So it seems that Dutch outsourced 
offshoring has led to growth in imports from China of homogeneous goods, while 
the growth of Dutch FDI stocks in China does not seem to have had a significant 
impact on either imports or exports of this type of goods. The sensitivity of 
imports with respect to Dutch distribution activities is lower than for the other 
types of goods. It indicates that the Dutch function as distributor mainly matters 
for differentiated goods and less for homogeneous goods. 
 
It is also noticeable that the effects of tariffs and transportation costs consistently 
keep the correct (negative) sign implicating that these variables indeed have an 
impeding effect on Dutch China trade. It is also interesting to see that the 
coefficient on the transportation cost variable is larger in the last two columns of 
table 5, than in its first two columns. It again shows that transportation costs 
matter most for homogeneous and reference priced goods and less for 
differentiated goods.  
 
The overall conclusion of this section is that Dutch offshoring to China has indeed 
significantly and positively affected trade growth between these two countries, 
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namely through imports. The estimation results suggest that Dutch firms have 
offshored in-house in case of asset specific goods and have offshored via the 
market in case of homogeneous goods (i.e. not asset specific goods). Dutch FDIs 
to China seem to have a vertical as opposed to horizontal character and thus have 
been motivated mainly by production efficiency reasons rather than market 
proximity reasons. Tariffs appear to have been significant impediments to Dutch 
exports to China as well as to imports from China, although their contribution to 
the latter is modest. Moreover, the increased importance of Dutch re-exports has 
been found to have a significantly positive effect on growth of Dutch imports 
from China but not for Dutch exports to China. 
 
The effect of declining transportation costs is statistically significant for reference 
priced and homogeneous goods, but not for differentiated goods. Since transport 
costs have only declined 7% over the past ten years, the overall economic effect, 
however, is negligible. Obviously the most sizeable effects, however, stem from 
Dutch and Chinese GDP growth. The elasticity between Dutch and Chinese GDP 
growth to import and export growth is close to unity, as theory would suggest. 
Finally, we have performed a number of robustness tests on our estimation results, 
which are not presented here. The tests show that the parameters of the model 
estimates are stable over time and that there is no evidence of heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation. 
 
6  Conclusions 
 
Trade between China and the Netherlands on average has grown 5 percentage 
points faster (annually) than China’s trade with the rest of the world and 4 
percentage points faster than China’s trade with its main partners in the last 
decade. Currently, China is Netherlands’ fifth largest trading partner and accounts 
for approximately 8% of total Dutch imports. These imports mainly comprise 
goods like computers, telecommunication devices and parts and components of 
computers and office machinery. The export to China looks different and 
comprises valves, industrial cooling and heating equipment, non-ferrous base 
metal waste, and chemicals like hydrocarbons, alcohols and phenols. 
 
Outsourcing and offshoring as part of the world wide process of globalization 
have been major determinants of this strong Dutch China trade growth. From that 
perspective this paper empirically investigates the determinants of bilateral trade 
flows between China and the Netherlands. A major finding is that Dutch 
offshoring to China has indeed had a significant effect on Dutch China trade 
growth. The effect of FDI on exports is also positive (although not significant), 
which indicates that the FDI from the Netherlands to China has had a vertical 
rather than a horizontal character and is thus mainly motivated by cost advantages 
rather than market proximity. So Dutch firms have moved parts of their 
production to China and have subsequently been importing intermediate inputs 
from China. The analysis suggest that Dutch offshoring to China has been mainly 
in-house rather than via the market. The results are similar to the findings Liu 
et.al.(2001) who also find a positive influence of FDI on trade, but are in contrast 
with Suyker and De Groot (2006) who state that most Dutch FDIs to China have a 
horizontal character. The decision of Dutch firms to offshore to China in-house or 
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via the market has been significantly influenced by the asset specificity (and thus 
by the transaction costs resulting from it) of the traded inputs. More specifically, 
the results show that FDI (representing in-house offshoring) has a positive and 
significant influence on the imports of differentiated goods while outsourced 
offshoring has a positive and significant influence on the imports of reference 
priced and homogeneous goods. The results indicate that differentiated goods are 
more sensitive to increases in Dutch re-export activities than homogeneous and 
reference priced goods. It reflects the fact that most re-exports of the Netherlands 
comprise differentiated goods. 
 
Obviously the results of this paper can not easily be generalised to other time 
periods or to different countries. The trade relation of the Netherlands and China 
is one between two economically and politically dissimilar countries. This relation 
is likely to have different dynamics than trade between countries that are similar 
in these dimensions. Also, the comparative advantages of China and the 
Netherlands are different than conventional advantages in for example high or low 
skilled labour intensive goods. China for example is (next to low skilled labour 
intensive goods) adept in assembly while the Netherlands seems to be strong in 
reducing transaction costs through trade and orchestrating production. 
Nonetheless, the results strongly indicate that transaction costs matter (especially 
for trading nations). Knowledge of how transaction costs influence the working of 
the economy is therefore indispensable in understanding trade growth and the 
governance structures of multinational firms. 
 
Policy Implications 
This knowledge is also useful for policies which aim to foster trade and, through 
trade, prosperity.  Moving abroad parts of actual production, while keeping the 
coordination and trade function at home can be a good productivity and welfare 
enhancing strategy for a trading country like the Netherlands. The relative 
efficiency of the Dutch to reduce transaction costs is an important source of Dutch 
comparative advantage. It is essential to exploit and maintain such comparative 
advantages. Therefore policy should stimulate investments in innovations that 
reduce these transaction costs. Part of these investments, e.g. in knowledge and 
infrastructure, have the characteristics of a public good (since it is non-rival and 
non-excludable). In this respect, the relative quality of Dutch institutions is 
particularly important. The Dutch institutional quality (although quite high) has 
deteriorated over the past 10 years compared to its main competitors. The 
Netherlands is having difficulty maintaining this part of its comparative advantage 
in reducing transaction costs. So institutions which facilitate trade in a globalizing 
world, should get special attention in government policy. 
 
Further Research 
The research of this paper can be extended in several directions. A first direction is 
to investigate the influence of globalization on bilateral trade flows between 
several industrialized countries and (other) BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China). 
Here it is of interest to see which comparative advantages these countries have 
with respect to each other and how these comparative advantages are related to 
factor endowments, institutional differences and cultural differences. Such 
analysis should also pay attention to trust and social capital, features which were 
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outside the scope of this study.  
 
From the more narrow perspective of Dutch China trade also some improvements 
can be made. The effect of transportation costs could be more accurately 
measured by specifying different transportation costs per product group since they 
are likely to differ substantially. The same holds for tariff rates. The proxy 
measuring outsourced offshoring could be improved if it would be possible to 
extract the part of this proxy that represents in-house offshoring. This would give 
a more accurate estimate of the affect of outsourced offshoring on trade. More 
detailed data should be obtained on the trade of intermediate inputs between the 
Netherlands and China to give a more precise description of Dutch offshoring and 
outsourcing to and from China. Finally, more research on Dutch re-exports is 
needed. To adequately assess the added value of re-exports to the Dutch economy, 
additional data is needed on the costs of the Dutch function as distributor. These 
costs are crucial in understanding if Dutch focus on re-exports should be increased 
or resources should be allocated to activities with better cost benefit ratios. 
However, the costs of re-exports are often neglected in literature, leading to wrong 
inferences about the economic attractiveness of the Dutch distribution function. 
Suyker and De Groot (2006) for example note that de margin on re-export is quite 
low (10%) compared to the margin on domestically produced goods (60%). But 
the resources used for re-export activities are likely to be modest compared to the 
resources used for domestic production. Thus the cost benefit ratio of re-exports 
might be higher than that of domestically produced goods. 
 
The latter suggestions for further research look at Dutch China trade from the 
perspective of welfare in the Netherlands. Similar further research would be 
needed to look at Dutch China trade from the perspective of the Chinese economy.  
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